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That Old Due Process Magic: Growth Control and the Federal
Constitution
Recent years have seen the proliferation of municipal laws limiting
the number of houses which can be built in a municipality. 1 The proponents of these laws praise them for giving communities time to develop comprehensive growth plans, for relieving pollution and smog,
and for helping to preserve the "quality of life."2 Opponents, on the
other hand, paint them as a self-interested, elitist effort to increase
property values and fence out newcomers. 3 These growth control ordinances (GCOs) usually operate by setting a yearly· cap on the
number of residential building permits that can be issued. 4 They have
been passed in cities from Maine to California. 5 In California, more
than 200 GCOs have been on city ballots since 1981. Seventy percent
of the ordinances proposed in the past two and a half years have been
approved. 6
The ordinances are usually enacted when people who are upset
with traffic congestion, concomitant smog, and related problems tum
to their local political apparatus for help. It is the wise local politician
who heeds this call: stubbornly pro-growth politicians seem to have a
1. THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMN. ON HOUSING, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMN.
ON HOUSING (1982); Katz & Rosen, The Interjurisdictional Effects of Growth Control on Housing
Prices, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 149 (1987); Boyarsky, Both Sides in Growth Issue Refining Their Campaigns, L.A. Times, Aug. 2, 1988, § 1, at 15, col. 3 (third part in a four-part series) [hereinafter
L.A. Times, part III]; Peterson, Land-Use Decisions Via the Ballot Box, N.Y. Times, May 22,
1988, § 10, at 20, col. 2.
·
2. Katz & Rosen, supra note 1, at 149; Murphy, Old Process a New Weapon in Slow-Growth
Arsenal, L.A. Times, Aug. 1, 1988, § 1, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter L.A. Times, part II]; see also Lee
v. City of Monterey Park, 173 cal. App. 798, 809 ("It is the intent of the People of the City of
Monterey Park to establish control over the quality . . . of growth [in] the City . . . [and]
preserv[e] the character of the community.").
3. Delogu, The Misuse of Land Use Control Powers Must End: Suggestions for Legislative
and Judicial Responses, 32 MAINE L. REv. 29 (1980); see also Associated Home Builders v. City
of Livermore, 18 cat. 3d 582, 616, 557 P.2d 473, 493, 135 cal. Rptr. 41, 61 (1976) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting); Trombley, Slow-Growth Sentiment Builds Fast, L.A. Times, July 31, 1988, § l, at 1,
col. 1 [hereinafter L.A. Times, part I].
4. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Assn. v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) (upholding a GCO allowing construction of 500 units per year);
L.A. Times, part III, supra note l, at 30, col. 2; see also Livermore, 18 cal. 3d at 588, 557 P .2d at
493, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (upholding a GCO which completely halted issue of residential building
permits); L.A. Times, part II, supra note 2, at 3, col. 1. For a discussion of the variety of techniques which can be employed, see Delogu, supra note 3, at 33-52. For a discussion openly
advocating exclusionary tactics and evaluating a municipality's probability of success with various techniques, see Comment, Speak out Against the Madness: A Laok at How to Control Growth
in California, 15 W. ST. U. L. REv. 335 (1987).
5. See, e.g., Livermore, 18 cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 cal. Rptr. 41; Petaluma, 522 F.2d
897; Begin v. Town of Sabattus, 409 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1979); Delogu, supra note 3, at 44 n.42
(discussing Maine Planned Growth Ordinance, § 2.1-2).
6. L.A. Times, part I, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1.
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limited future. 7 Wise politicians and local residents get together, and
by means of initiative or legislation, enact a GCO. Once a GCO is
enacted, several things happen. One of the first results is that property
values increase. When demand for housing in a growing community is
high and supply is curtailed, prices will rise. In GCO communities,
this is exactly what occurs. 8 This is not, however, an unqualified bonanza for property owners. Higher property values mean higher property taxes. The traffic congestion is not likely to improve. The people
who would have moved there and paid local taxes now simply drive
through. 9
Another result of GCOs is that local renters will see their rents
increase. 10 Local developers are also affected. Land acquired for development ties up capital. As more and more communities pass
GCOs, there is less work for the carpenters, plumbers, bricklayers,
and other tradespeople who build the homes. The businesses supplying the construction industry will be affected when construction declines.11 Local commerce will be affected. There will be fewer new
clients for local retail and service businesses, and fewer retail and service businesses will open. 12
GCOs will also affect people who do not already live in the community, but who would like to move there. Indeed, keeping new people out is precisely what the ordinances are meant to accomplish. t3
The higher prices and lower supply of homes in the area will make it
more difficult, more expensive, and less possible for new residents to
move there. The people GCOs exclude are nonmunicipal federal citizens, and they have an interest in being able to migrate anywhere that
the winds of national economic fortune might take them. Despite this
effect on their interests, these extra-municipal citizens seldom chal7. Id.; San Diego's News & Views, July 13, 1989, at 6, col. 1, statement of Peter Navarro,
organizer of PLAN (Prevent Los Angelization Now): "Our major target in the upcoming race is
to dump [councilperson] Ed Struiksma in the Fifth District. We believe Mr. Struiksma is the
most dangerous pro-development force on the council."
8. Katz & Rosen, supra note l, at 159; Schwartz, Hansen & Green, The Effect of Growth
Control on the Production of Moderate-Priced Housing, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT: KEEPING
ON TARGET? 15 (D. Porter ed. 1986) [hereinafter Effect of Growth Control]; THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMN. ON HOUSING, supra note 1, at 204; Trombley, Slow-Growth Initiatives Ignore the Larger
Problem, L.A. Times, Aug. 3, 1988, § I, at 3, col. 2.
9. Cf., L.A. Times I, supra note 3, at 30, col. 1 ("[S]uburban 'office' parks have placed an
additional burden on already strained highways").
10. Effect of Growth Control, supra note 8, at 19. Note that since they are predominantly
dependent on the rental market, the region's poor are especially affected. Problems with homelessness will be aggravated if those only marginally able to afford housing are priced out of the
market.
11. Rubinfeld, Suburban Employment and Zoning: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 18 J.
REGIONAL SCI. 33, 40 (1978).
12. Id.
13. See Construction Indus. Assn. v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 575-76 (N.D. Cal.
1974), revd., 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) ("FINDINGS OF
FACT •.. , [11hey set about quite openly to curb the population growth in their city.").
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lenge the ordinances. Rather, it is the local builders and developers
who take the municipalities to court. When they do, success is rare.
The ordinances are usually reviewed under the due process clause.
In part, due process review is a result of the pecuniary nature of the
developers' interest - GCOs look very much like the government taking that is typical of due process review. It may also be to some extent
an accident of historical circumstance. When the mold was set for
review of land use regulation, when Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 14
and Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 15 were decided, due process
was a more attractive vehicle for prospective litigants. At the time, ·socalled "substantive" due process was a serious and frequently applied
limit on the government's police power. 16 The heyday of substantive
due process, the New Deal, and the Court's retreat in the face of.the
court packing plan are the stuff of which legends and constitutional
law books are made. Although the judiciary's fascination with due
process has waned, 17 the gaze of land use regulation review has remained fixed on the due process clause.
.
This Note argues that the interests of nonmunicipal federal citizens
in being able freely to migrate about the nation are not adequately
accounted for in a due process analysis which sanctions regulations
with any, even a debatable, relation to the public welfare. 18
More adaptable and appropriate are the constitutional safeguards
designed to protect the interests of no~municipal federal citizens: the
privileges and immunities clause, the right of interstate ~ravel, 19 and
the commerce clause. This Note concludes that GCOs should be measured against these safeguards and not the standards of the due process clause. When so reviewed, GCOs are found wanting. Indeed,
this Note argues that the problem with GCOs is not simply that they
offend a collection of constitutional protections, but that they offend
14. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (statute forbidding mining so as to cause subsidence of private residences, even when that mining is done pursuant to stipulation in the property's conveyance, is an
unconstitutional taking of private property).
15. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See infra section I.A for a discussion of Euclid.
16. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 11.3 (3d ed. 1986); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 572-81 (2d ed. 1988).
17. On the other hand, the clause's substantive impact has apparently reemerged in privacy
cases like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text for a more elaborate description of the
standard. See also 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 3D § 3.20 (1986):
19. Suggesting that GCOs be reviewed by the standards of the right to interstate travel is not
an idea original to this Note. See generally Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 612 (1972) [hereinafter
Comment, Another Constitutional Standard]; Comment, The Right to Travel and Its Application
to Restrictive Housing Laws, 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 635 (1971). The proposition has also been
advanced in at least two cases, Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582,
447 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1976), and Construction Indus. Assn. v. City of Petaluma, 522
F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). See infra note 58 for a discussion of
Livermore's treatment of the issue.
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the idea that underlies those constitutional protections. That underlying idea is national unity -. the idea that the nation is and must be a
cohesive, harmonious unit, that the states must sink or swim together,
that the health of the national union cannot be taxed by myopic and
self-interested local regulation.
Part I first examines the traditional due process standard under
which GCOs are now reviewed. It next examines the ways in which
the public welfare component of that standard becomes distorted
when trying to account for the interests of not only municipal, but also
nonmunicipal, citizens. That examination begins with a discussion of
GCO cases in which the standard has become distorted, and concludes
with an analysis of the problems posed by that distortion.
As Part I concludes that due process review is inappropriate for
GCOs, Part II examines the larger federal interests which cause the
distortion of that standard. GCOs are at their core a particular municipality's codification of its dislike for its national neighbors. It is
that animosity which is at odds with the concept of national unity. If
the nation is to survive and prosper, harmony must prevail between its
constituent entities. This concept was not overlooked by the Framers
when the Constitution was written and ratified. Neither is it a concept
foreign to the jilrisprudence of the Supreme Court. Part II examines
these sources as authority for the proposition that fundamental structural concerns of federalism are implicated and offended by GCOs.
Part III examines GCOs under the constitutional standards that
embody the structural concerns discussed in Part II. The privileges
and immunities clause, 20 the commerce clause, 21 and the right of interstate travel22 all work to ensure both the equality of treatment of citizens within and among states, and the interstate harmony and
cooperation which must prevail if the nation is to succeed. Part III
applies each of these protections to GCOs and in each case finds that
the only permissible GCOs are those that address problems susceptible
of no alternative solution.

I.

CURRENT GCO

REVIEW

An understanding of why due process is the wrong standard for
GCO review begins with an understanding of the standard and how it
works in GCO cases. Section A of this Part analyzes the development
of the standard and section B looks at how the standard operates in
GCO cases, with an emphasis on the distortion of the "public welfare"
component of that standard by GCO issues. Since that distortion is
central to due process shortcomings in GCO analysis, section C exam20. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,.cl. 3.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969).
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ines more closely how that distortion occurs and the problems it can
cause.
A.

Traditional Deference to Local Land Use Regulation

The standards for GCO review find their origin in the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 23
Until Euclid, it was an open question whether any sort of zoning regulation by local communities was constitutionally permissible.24 · State
courts oflast resort were divided on the issue25 and not until the years
following Euclid did zoning become commonplace. 26
The village of Euclid was adjacent to the city of Cleveland. The
Ambler Realty company owned sixty-eight acres of land in the village.
The land was bounded by a railroad and a major street and was "in
the path of progressive industrial development." 27 Ambler Realty's
intention had. been to sell the land for industrial use. In 1922 the village adopted a detailed zoning ordinance, establishing six land-use
classifications and districts. The ordinance prohibited industrial use
on most of Ambler's land. As a result, the land lost seventy-five percent of its value. 28 Ambler Realty contended that the ordinance had
deprived them of property without due process of law. 29
In examining the law, the Court recognized the "modem" origin
of zoning laws as a response .to increasea urbanization and more efficient transportation. If the laws were to be upheld, the Court felt that
they "must find their justification in some aspect of the police power,
asserted for the public welfare."30 Explaining the standard by which
that determination would be made, the Court stated that "before the
23. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
24. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 18, § 3.01, at 83 ("[In] 1926 ..• the Supreme Court of the
United States disposed of the fundamental question whether this kind of land use restriction is
offensive to the Constitution of the United States."); 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZoNING &
PLANNING, § 1.01, 1-09 to 1-10 (4th ed. 1975).
25. 272 U.S. at 390-91.
26. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING & LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 71 (1971)
("After Euclid, so-called Euclidian zoning swept the country."); see also 1 R ANDERSON, supra
note 18, § 3.10, at 104.
27. 272 U.S. at 384.
28. 272 U.S. at 384.
29. 272 U.S. at 384. They also alleged that the ordinance denied them equal protection of
the laws and violated art. I,§§ I & 19 of the Ohio Constitution. Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution bestowed upon "[a]ll men ..• [the] inalienable right [] ... of ... acquiring, possessing and
protecting property." Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 310 (N.D. Ohio 1924),
revd. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Section 19 included the guarantee that "[p]rivate property shall ever
be held inviolate," along with a takings clause. 297 F. at 310. The lower court found that the
zoning law violated all three provisions as well as the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 297 F. at 310. The U.S. Supreme Court considered only the
federal due process clause issue. In the view of Justice Sutherland, the multiple challenges boiled
down to a single question: whether the ordinance exceeded the reach of the police power. 272
U.S. at 386.
·
30. 272 U.S. at 387.
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ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, [it must be said] that such
provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 31
The zoning regulations were arguably related to the public welfare because reports showing "every evidence of painstaking consideration"
concluded that ordinances of the sort would decrease traffic, accidents,
noise, and would facilitate fire protection. 32 The painstaking report
was enough to establish the relation to public welfare, because "[if] the
validity of the legislative classification ... [is] fairly debatable, the
legislative judgment must be allowed to control. "33
This formulation has come to characterize the review of local land
use regulation. Virtually any possible relationship to the "public
health, safety, morals or general welfare" will make the relation of
such a regulation to public welfare "fairly debatable" and enable it to
withstand constitutional challenge. The presumption of constitutionality accorded to any legislative act has become virtually insurmountable in the case of local land use regulation. 34 In 1954 that presumption
was described by the Court as "well nigh conclusive. " 35 As land use
regulation has come to include GCOs, so too has the Euclid deference.
It is worth noting that the opinion itself does not necessarily support the deference Euclid has come to represent. The opinion is perhaps explained by that Court's wish to enable communities to respond
to the historical forces around them. The police power would not be
arrested by the changing times because "while the meaning of the constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must
expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions."36 That
constitutional guarantees must yield to the demands of a changing society could also be construed to mean that since GCOs pose a threat to
national unity not contemplated by the architects of Euclid, due process standards should contract and review of local land use law should
be invigorated. Any deference suggested by Euclid should perhaps be
tempered by its recognition that there could be cases "where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the munici31. 272 U.S. at 395.
32. 272 U.S. at 394.
33. 272 U.S. at 388.
34. The Euclid Court cited a case invoking the presumption for a New York statute prohibiting women from working the night shift in large city restaurants as authority for its "fairly
debatable" language. 272 U.S. at 388, citing Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924). On that
presumption, see also 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 18, § 3.14, at 119-21; A. RATHKOPF, supra
note 24, at § 5.02[1] and cases cited at note 2 therein; D. HAGMAN supra note 26, at 71-72;
Comment, State and Federal Housing Policy vs. Local Land Use Regulation: The New Conflict
Between State and Municipal Powers in California, 15 U.S.F. L. REV. 509, 524-25 (1980-81).
35. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (upholding the taking of private land to be
turned over to a different private party as part of an urban renewal project, even where it was
unclear that the land taken was in fact blighted).
36. 272 U.S. at 387.
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pality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the
way."37
History casts even more doubt on the proposition that Euclid was
intended to mandate deference. First, such an approach would have
been a counterpoint to the heyday of substantive due process then taking place. 38 Second, only two years after Euclid, the Court decided
Nectow v. City of Cambridge. 39 Nectow was also a zoning case where,
like Euclid, land being held for industrial use was zoned residential.
In Nectow, the Court invalidated the ordinance, observing that' "governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general
rights of the land owner ... is not unlimited [and where the police
power justification] is wanting, the action of the zoning authorities ...
cannot be sustained."40 Where a "painstaking report" was sufficient
to establish the relation to the public welfare in Euclid, a master's report finding no relation was sufficient to overcome the presumption in
Nectow. It appears that the Court did not intend Euclid to be a talisman of judicial abdication in the face of any land use regulation.
Moreover, Euclid's observation that the "general public interest"
could sometimes "outweigh the interest of the municipality"41 foreshadows the expanded definition of public welfare in GCO cases.
B. Public Welfare and GCOs

The presumption of constitutionality is the yardstick by which an
ordinance's relation to the public welfare is measured. Traditional due
process analysis would consider only the possibility that some benefit
might accrue to the enacting municipality. But the negative extra-municipal effects of GCOs coax into the due process standard a variety of
balancing test. That balancing test comes in through the door marked
"public welfare." When the definition of public welfare includes only
the welfare of the municipality, the balance will seldom weigh against
the enacting community. But where the definition of public welfare
extends beyond the municipal borders, that balance may tilt the other
way. For GCOs, a local definition of public welfare will at best lead to
a tie: higher property values and the planning respite are likely to
balance against the interests of local renters, developers, and business
people. With the benefit of Euclid's presumptive deference, the statute will be upheld. However, if the scope of public welfare includes
that of the federal citizens who can no longer move to the city, the bad
37. 272 U.S. at 390.
38. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402
(1926) (invalidating prohibition on use of substandard filling in bedding materials); see also supra
note 16.
39. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
40. 277 U.S. 183, 188·89.
41. 272 U.S. at 390.

Michigan Law Review

1252

[Vol. 88:1245

effects of the GCO may outweigh its good effects. The presumption of
constitutionality should then be vulnerable. Nonetheless, in some
courts the Euclidian deference will overcome even an expanded definition of public welfare. Two important GCO cases illustrate this
pattern.
1.

Where Deference Outweighs Expanded Public Welfare

The first important case in which an expanded definition of public
welfare was insufficient to overcome Euclidian deference is Golden v.
Planning Board of Ramapo. 42 In Ramapo the New York Court of
Appeals considered an ordinance that limited growth in the village of
Ramapo by setting a timetable for residential construction. The ordinance delayed development for up'"to 18 years in certain areas." 43 It
operated by awarding approval for subdivision plats according to a
complicated point system tied to the prior provision of municipal services, w~ch the town planned to phase in gradually. Predictably, the
ordinance was challenged under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Explaining the standard that would govern its decision,
the court said that "[w]hat segregates permissible from impermissible
restrictions, depends in the final analysis upon the purpose of the restrictions and their impact in terms of both the community and general
public interest. " 44 The New York court "assume[d] that development
shall not stop at the community's threshold." 45 This formulation suggests that the "public interest" reaches beyond municipal boundaries,
and the court "only require[s] that communities confront the challenge of population growth with open doors."46 But the interests of
those outside the community reflected in an expanded definition of
public welfare did not overcome the influence of Euclid. The New
York court repeatedly cites Euclid, even when formulating the regional public interest standard.47 The court cites Euclid for the proposition that "it is the nature of land use and development regulations to
... impede the forces of natural growth."48 They "assume, therefore,
that the [ordinance is] the product of foresighted planning calculated
to promote the welfare of the township." 49 The regulation was up42. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003

~~

.

43. 30 N.Y.2d at 380, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
44. 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (emphasis added).
45. 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
46. 30 N.Y.2d at 379, 285 .N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
47. The Ramapo court cites Euclid five times: 30 N.Y.2d at 366, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 142 (once); 30 N.Y.2d at 371, 285 N.E.2d at 297, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 146 (once); 30
N.Y.2d at 377, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151 (once); and 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285
N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (twice).
48. 30 N.Y.2d at 377, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
49. 30 N.Y.2d at 380, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
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held. The dissent put more emphasis on the regional welfare, and felt
that the "ordinance ... reflect[s] a parochial stance without regard to
its impact on the region or the State."so
The second important GCO case in which expanded public welfare
failed to overcome Euclidian deference is.Associated Home Builders v.
· City of Livermore. st Livermore was an important case for several reasons. First, it established the viability in California of initiatives setting caps on the immigration of people into a municipality. The
viability of GCOs in California makes the case important because California is both the most populous states2 and because it has the most
GCOs. s3 Second, it was a well-written opinion handed down by a
court to which many sister state courts look for guidance. s4 Third,
together with Ramapo, it authoritatively established the constitutionality of GCOs. Finally, it is important because it explicitly defined the
public welfare in regional, as opposed to local, terms.
The case began in 1972 when the city of Livermore approved an
initiative ordinance halting residential construction. The ordinance
imposed a moratoriu~ on the issue of residential building permits.
The drafters of the ordinance had apparently read Euclid or its progeny. ss It declared that "the health, safety and general welfare" of the
city as reflected in "[e]ducational facilities," "[s]ewage," and "[w]ater
supply" would be served by allowing "no further residential permits
... to be issued."S6 Builders and others with interests in continued
construction secured a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement
of the ordinance. The city appealed to the California Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court first upheld the ordinance against
municipal enabling clauses7 and vaguenessss challenges. The Builders'
SO. 30 N.Y.2d at 383, 28S N.E.2d at 30S, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 1S6 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
St. 18 Cal. 3d S82, SS7 P.2d 473, 13S Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
S2. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1989, at xv.
S3. L.A. Times, part I, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1.
S4. Harrison, State Court Activism in Exclusionary-Zoning Cases, in STATE SUPREME
COURTS: POLICY MAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM SS (M. Porter & G. Tarr eds. 1982);
Baum & Cannon, State Supreme Courts as Activists: New Doctrines in the Law of Torts, in id. at
83-84. For a study concluding that the California Supreme Court was at the time a leader in
judicial activism, sees. FINO, THE ROLE OF STATE SUPREME COURTS IN THE NEW JUDICIAL
FEDERALISM (1987).
SS. See L.A. Times I, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1 (discussing a lawyer who writes the ordinances
for citizens' groups). Compare L.A. Times III, supra note 1, at 3, col. 2 ("It is almost impossible
to draw a land-use initiative without a lawyer ....").
S6. 18 Cal. 3d at S89 n.2, SS7 P.2d at 476 n.2, 13S Cal. Rptr. at 44 n.2.
S7. 18 Cal. 3d at S96, SS7 P.2d at 481, 13S Cal. Rptr. at 49. In order to do this, it was first
necessary to overrule a 1929 case, Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 222 P. 308 (1929).
On enabling acts generally, see 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note·18; § 2.19-29.
·
S8. 18 Cal. 3d at 600, SS7 P.2d at 483, 13S Cal. Rptr. at St. This challenge was the second
part of a two-pronged police-power attack. The first prong of that attack was the claim that the
ordinance infringed on the right to interstate travel. 18 Cal. 3d at 600, SS7 P.2d at 483, 13S Cal.
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Association then advanced the traditional due process challenge, that
the ordinance was an unconstitutional exercise of the police power.
The court did not doubt that the "ordinance . . . significantly affects
nonresidents of the municipality." 59 The ordinance, though "superficially reasonable," might be "unreasonable when viewed from a larger
perspective." 60 Examining the ordinance from this larger perspective,
the court noted that since "the ordinance may strongly influence the
supply and distribution of housing for an entire metropolitan region,
judicial inquiry must consider the welfare of that region. " 61 By articulating the public welfare in regional terms, the court broadened the
scope of the traditional due process standard. The California court
found support for this broader standard in Euclid, which "recognized
'the possibility of cases where the general public interest would so far
outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would
not be allowed to stand in the way.' " 62 But Euclid is better known for
deference than for balancing. The court noted that "if it is fairly debatable that the ordinance is reasonably related to the public welfare,
the ordinance is constitutional. " 63 This was "the standard of constitutional adjudication . . . set forth in Euclid v. Ambler Co. " 64 Cases
which "declined to accord the traditional deference to legislative judgment" could not "serve as a guide."65 That deference carried with it a
"presumption of constitutionality" which the Builders' Association
had failed ·to overcome. 66 The dissent saw the balance as tipping in the
other direction. Justice Mosk characterized the GCO as a "suburban
Rptr. at 51. See infra section 111.B. for a discussion of the right of interstate travel. In spite of its
other merits, this section of the court's opinion relies to some extent on sleight of hand.
Contrary to its later acknowledgment that "the ordinance may strongly influence the supply
and distribution of housing" in the region, 18 Cal. 3d at 607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at
55, the court here claims that the ordinance did "not penalize travel and resettlement," 18 Cal.
3d at 603, 557 P.2d at 484, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 52; see also supra note 8. Concluding its analysis of
the right of interstate travel, the court claimed that "[t]he only contrary authority, the decision of
the federal district court in ... Petaluma .•. has now been reversed by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.... 522 F.2d 897, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934." While it is true that the district
court's decision was reversed, the California court's language implies that the substantive hold·
ing, that a GCO violates the fundamental right of interstate travel, was reversed. In fact, the
Ninth Circuit did not consider the travel issue. It instead determined that the construction associ·
ation lacked standing to assert a third party's travel rights. Construction Indus. Assn. v. City of
Petaluma, 522F.2d 897, 905 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). In short, despite
the California court's adroit linguistics, the only federal court to consider the issue, the district
court in Petaluma, has decided that GCOs violate the right of interstate travel.
59. 18 Cal. 3d at 607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
60. 18 Cal. 3d at 607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
61. 18 Cal. 3d at 607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
62. 18 Cal. 3d at 607, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56 (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co. 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926)).
63. 18 Cal. 3d at 606, 557 P.2d at 486, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
64. 18 Cal. 3d at 606, 557 P.2d at 486, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 54 (citing 272 U.S. 365).
65. 18 Cal. 3d at 606, 557 P.2d at 486-87, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 54-55.
66. 18·Cal. 3d at 610, 557 P.2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
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community [that] invokes an elitist concept to construct a mythical
moat around its perimeter ... to exclude all but its fortunate current
residents. " 67
2.

Where Expanded Public Welfare Overcomes Deference

Expanded definitions of public welfare will sometimes outweigh
Euclidian deference. One example of this is the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's opinion in National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn. 68 In National Land, the Pennsylvania city of Easttown was becoming suburban. They passed an ordinance which required a minimum lot size of
four acres in the township's prime residential land. The value of National Land's property dropped seventy-five percent, as had Ambler
Realty's. They too challenged it under the due process clause. In an
analysis that initially resembled standard due process review, the court
observed that the ordinance was related to the public welfare because
it alleviated sewage and traffic problems and forestalled difficulty in
providing fire protection. The court stated that the ordinance need
only "be enacted for the health, safety, morals or general welfare of
~he community." 69
That general welfare, however, included the surrounding region.
The zoning power, according to the court, "may not be used as a
. means to deny the future. . . . It is not difficult to envision the . . .
chaotic conditions which would result if all the townships in this area
decided to deny a growing population sites for residential development
• • • • " 70 The court declared the ordinance unconstitutional, closing
out its opinion with this comment on the public welfare:
The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way of the
natural forces which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live. We have concluded
not. A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens.... can not be held
valid....
. . . It is clear, however, that the general welfare is not fostered or
promoted by a zoning ordinance designed to be exclusive and
exclusionary. 71
Five years later, in Appeal ofGirsh,72 the Pennsylvania court reiterated its stance. In· Girsh, the Township of Nether Province had re67. 18 Cal. 3d at 616, 557 P.2d at 493, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 61 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Cf
Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 246, 263 A.2d 395, 399 (1970) (A township "cannot be allowed to
close its doors to others seeking a 'comfortable place to live.'"). See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of Girsh.
68. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
69. 419 Pa. at 522, 215 A.2d at 607.
70. 419 Pa. at 528, 215 A.2d at 610.
71. 419 Pa. at 532-33, 215 A.2d at 612.
72. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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fused to allow apartments within its borders. The court felt the
township had "made a decision that it is content with things as they
· are . . . . That decision is unacceptable. " 73 The court said that "if
Nether Province is a logical place for development to take place, it
should not be heard to say that it will not bear its rightful part of the
burden." 74
Pennsylvania is not the only court to impose public welfare limits
on GCOs. In New Hampshire, the state's supreme court considered
the GCO issue in Beck v. Town ofRaymond. 15 The town of Raymond
enacted an ordinance in 1977 which allowed landowners a maximum
of four building permits per year. The familiar due process issue was
"whether the ... ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power." 76
Euclid was cited for the proposition that the "power to restrict and
regulate population density necessarily implies the authority to . . .
control population growth." 77 While the court had "allowed municipalities fairly wide latitude in using their general police power," 78
there were limits:
Towns may not refuse to confront the future by building a moat
around themselves and pulling up the drawbridge. They must develop
plans to insure that municipal services, which normal growth will require, will be provided for in an orderly and rational manner. Any limitations on expansion must not unreasonably restrict normal growth. 79

C.

The Problems with an Expanded Definition of Public Welfare

These examples should illustrate the problems with due process
review of GCOs .. Whether the substantive outcome is favorable or unfavorable to GCOs, the procedural outcome is the distortion of the due
process standard. Due process has three chief concerns, and it is use73. 437 Pa. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398. The Pennsylvania court's stance is perhaps influenced
by their belief that "the right of people to live on land, [is] a very different [question than more
typical zoning issues]." 437 Pa. at 245, 263 A.2d at 399 (emphasis in original).
74. 437 Pa. at 245, 263 A.2d at 398-99 (footnote omitted).
75. 118 N.H. 793, 394 A.2d 847 (1978).
76. 118 N.H. at 795, 394 A.2d at 849.
77. 118 N.H. at 796, 394 A.2d at 849.
78. 118 N.H. at 798, 394 A.2d at 850.
79. 118 N.H. at 801, 394 A.2d at 852. The court in Raymond was explicit in urging the
township to come up with a sensible plan to accommodate growth. It decided to allow "the town
two years at most to develop a master or comprehensive plan" for growth. 118 N.H. at 801, 394
A.2d at 852. "An ideal solution" to growth problems would be "effective regional or state-wide
land-use planning." 118 N.H. at 801, 394 A.2d at 852. Though the ordinance was left intact
during that grace period, the court nonetheless gave developer Beck the requested building permits and cautioned that "[t]his zoning ordinance as a permanent enactment is of doubtful validity.... Its apparent primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers [and t]his alone is
not a valid public purpose." 118 N.H. at 801, 394 A.2d at 852 (emphasis in original). The court
reaffirmed its commitment to regional definitions of public welfare six years later in StoneyBrook Dev. Corp. v. Town of Premont, 124 N.H. 583, 474 A.2d 561 (1984). New Hampshire's
Supreme Court found it "unrealistic" to suggest a three percent growth cap when "the average
growth in the seven abutting towns is almost double that." 124 N.H. at 589, 474 A.2d at 564.
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ful to isolate exactly which strand of due process makes GCOs problematic. Those three concerns are: whether a given procedural forum
operates fairly with respect to participants; whether a taking of private
property for public use for which compensation is due has occurred;
and whether a proposed regulation affecting private property interests
benefits the public sufficiently to justify that intrusion. 80
It is the last of these, the "police power" question, that is problematic in the GCO context and which lends itself to expansive formulations. An inquiry into the extent of government power lends itself
naturally to setting limits on that power. By confining that inquiry,
the traditionally deferential due process standard permits the governmental actor the freedom necessary to act in the public interest. The
due process standard traditionally confines that inquiry by asking only
whether the asserted positive public welfare benefits of the regulation
actually exist. The distortion in the GCO analysis comes when the
ordinance's potential negative effects are considered.
That those negative GCO effects are weighed is understandable.
GCOs do have potential negative effects, and those effects should be
considered. Public welfare does seem to be the appropriate analytic
vehicle. However, there are some problems which arise when this occurs. First, distorting due process standards by including potential
negative as well as potential positive public welfare effects provides an
effectively standardless tool for review of every single goveriunent regulation. This is demonstrated not only by the way the standard was
handled prior to the court packing crisis, 81 but also by the fact, illustrated in section II.B, that an expanded definition of public welfare
provides no effective barometer of a GCO's constitutionality. Second,
due process traditionally considers only positive potential public welfare benefits because it, in the usual case, considers the effect of the
regulation on a particular individual. Adapting it to consider instead
countervailing collective interests not only distorts the standards and
makes miscalculation more likely in future individual effect cases, but
also shortchanges the collective interests being considered. They are
shortchanged first because the presumptions run against them rather
than in their favor. The presumption is that the statute is constitutional, a presumption satisfied by a debatable relationship. Second,
they are shortchanged because the inquiry itself, designed for other
purposes, will be less able to articulate and recognize those collective
interests. The voice of national unity and nonmunicipa~ federal citizens' concerns is more readily couched in the language of "privileges
80. On due process with respect to land use regulation, see D. MANDELKER, LAND USE
ch. 2 (2d ed. 1988). On due process generally, and the distinction between substantive and
procedural due process, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 16, at § 10.6.
81. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
LAW
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and immunities" and "interstate relations" than in the language of
"police power" and "fairly debatable."
Thus despite its apparent ability to weigh the competing concerns,
th~ due process clause is the wrong tool for GCO analysis. It is a
disservice both to the standard and the newly encompassed interests to
employ due process review. GCOs should instead be examined under
standards specifically tailored to the implicated collective interests.
Perhaps the most important of those interests is that of national unity.
When GCOs say to their national neighbors "keep out," the harmony
of the union is offended in a way that deserves careful attention. The
next section explores that topic.
II. NATIONAL UNITY AND GCOs
This part is concerned with the effect of GCOs on national unity.
It begins with a brief examination of how GCOs affect that unity and
then turns to an analysis of the legal and doctrinal foundations for
those unity concerns. Section II.A explores the unity concerns expressed during the framing and ratification of the Constitution. Those
concerns cast GCOs in a different light: by virtue of their effect on
national unity, they can no longer be considered simply "local" issues.
Section II.B examines the ways in which the Constitution itself, both
textually and structurally, works to ensure national unity. Finally,
section II.C finds that the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution are also solicitous of national unity concerns.
As to how GCOs affect national unity, when a city shuts its doors
to outsiders it does more than lose the benefits of the newcomers' diversity. It invites their resentment. It invites both retaliation and emulation. As GCOs proliferate, so does resentment and retaliation. As
much as their practical effect, the problem with GCOs lies in their
message. That message, simply put, is: "We don't want you here." If
there is to be national unity, if the nation is to be a cohesive, successful
unit, this kind of message cannot go unchecked. It fans the flames of
factionalism in ways that have been problematic since the Framers'
time. When they structured the new government, that federal structure included a strong strand of national unity. Thus national unity is
a component, of federalism. It is important to examine that component here because these federalism concerns inform the privileges and
immunities clause, right of interstate travel and commerce clause analyses that will be undertaken in Part III.
. That national unity is a component of federalism may seem an
unusual claim. Most djscussion of federalism is focused on the allocation of power between levels of government, and the amount of power
that resides in the states after creation of the national government. 82
82. R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987); W. BENNEIT, AMERICAN
THEORIES OF FEDERALISM (1964); C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITU·
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But there could be no discussion of how that authority was allocated if
a national union had not been created. Although how much power
resides in the states is an important issue, the power.vested in the federal government must, at a minimum, be sufficient to maintain the
union created. It is no secret that the chief reason for calling the Constitutional Convention was that government under the Articles of
Confederation was unable to protect the union. 83 The implicit, often
assumed, consideration in the allocation of power between the national
and state governments is the ability of the national government to
maintain the health of the national union. While reasonable people
might differ over whether that allocation has in certain areas tilted too
sharply toward the federal government84 or whether that tilt is justified by historical change, 85 this Part will instead elucidate that often
overlooked premise. It begins by examining the framing of the Constitution and the Framers' efforts to equip the union with a charter sufficient to protect itself against threats to its unity.
A. National Unity: Goals and Means at the Time of Framing
A key concern of the Framers was not simply that economic relations under the Articles of Confederation were hindered, but that faction and divisiveness among the member states was leading to discord
and disunion. James Madison characterized the Confederation as
"notoriously feeble. " 86 He would later write that "most of us carried
into the Convention a profound impression produced by the experienced inadequacy of the old Confederation ... as to the necessity of
binding the States together by a strong Constitution." 87 Madison
hoped that the Constitution would help remedy "the gross and disreputable inequalities which had been prominent in the internal adminisTIONAL LAW (1969); FEDERALISM: INFINITE VARIETY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (V. Earle
ed. 1968); D. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM (1987); C. FRIEDRICH, TRENDS OF FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1968); R. LEACH, AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1970); R. POUND,
FEDERALISM AS A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS (1942). All cites are passim.
83. Broyles, Federalism and Political Life, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION: THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 71-72 (C. Kesler ed. 1987); D. ELAZAR, supra note 82,
at 94, 106; M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 44 (1944); R. LEACH, supra
note 82 at 3-4; Mason, The Constitutional Convention, in THE" CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 38 (G. Wood ed. 1973); W. MURPHY, THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM 49 (1967);
W. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 16-18 (1964). See also infra
notes ,87-108 and accompanying text.
84. Compare B. MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1964) (advocating a strong
federal role in the civil rights arena) with DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, THE STATUS OF FEDERALISM IN AMERICA: A REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FEDERALISM (1986) (advocating
increased state autonomy).
85. See Jaffa, The Case for A Stronger National Government, in A NATION OF STATES 106
(R. Goldwin ed. 1963); R. POUND, supra note 82, at 49.
86. III THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 135 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1937) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
87. III THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 449 (M. Farrand ed.
1911) [hereinafter FARRAND] (letter of J. Madison to J.G. Jackson).
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trations of most of the States." 88 It would exert a "restraining
influence . . . on the aberrations of the States . . . stifl[ing] wishes &
inclinations which w[oul]d otherwise ripen into overt & pernicious
acts." 89
When commenting on William Patterson's plan for the union,
Madison wanted to know if "it [will] prevent trespasses of the States
on each other?" 90 The problem with Patterson's plan was that it left
the states "as much at liberty as ever to execute their unrighteous
projects ag[ain]st each other." 91 As an example he referred to "Acts
of Virg[ini]a & Maryland which give a preference to their own citizens. "92 The multiple authority to coin money was leading to "retaliating acts ... which threatened danger not to the harmony only, but
the tranquility of the Union."93
The concern of the Framers with interstate discord is also reflected
in the words of Alexander Hamilton. Writing in The Federalist No.
22, he said:
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given
just cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that
examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be
multiplied and extended till [sic] they became not less serious sources of
animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the [commerce] between the different parts of the Confederacy.... [W]e may reasonably
expect, from the gradual conflicts of State regulations, that the citizens of
each would at length come to be considered and treated by the others in
no better light than that of foreigners and aliens. 9 4

At the debate of New York's ratification convention, Hamilton explained that one weakness of the Confederate Congress was that its
members had "a strong and uniform attachment to the interests of
their own state. These interests ... have too often been preferred to
the welfare of the Union." 95 He articulated the same sentiment on
another occasion:
[T]he members have but too frequently displayed the character rather of
partisans of their respective States than of impartial guardians of a common interest . . . the great interests of the nation have suffered on a
hundred [occasions] from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular States. 96
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
III FARRAND, supra note 87, at 455.
I FARRAND, supra note 87, at 317.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 318.
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 133 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898).
II ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 266..
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, No. 46 (J. Madison), at 314.
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Assemblyperson Iredell noted the same problem in the ratification
debate in North Carolina. In the process, he provided an apparently
unwitting display of the discord to which factionalism was leading.
He was addressing the objection that the Constitution required only
two-thirds of its members in order to be amended. The Articles required unanimity, and it was argued that this safeguard was important. Iredell countered that allowing a single state to thwart the will of
the majority was a less appealing alternative. He used the example of
Rhode Island, which "uniformly opposed every regulation for the benefit and honor of the Union at large." 97 He continued that "the happiness of all America ought not to be sacrificed to the caprice and
obstinacy of so inconsiderable a part."98
Although the confrontational rather than conciliatory nature of
these remarks may have been alarming, it was, in the minds of the
Framers, a likely more serious token of that discord that the state of
Massachusetts, in contravention of the Articles, was assembling an
army "without having even deigned to apprise Cong[res]s of Her
intention."99
Given the Framers' evident concern with interstate conflict, national disunion, and local prejudice, it is to be expected that they proposed some solution. Hamilton ironically wondered "shall we then
form a constitution to cherish and strengthen these prejudices? Shall
we confirm the distemper, instead of remedying it?" 100 The purpose of
the nation-building enterprise was to remedy that conflict. That remedy was to be a charter designed to reach and cure the causes of
disharmony.
Hamilton felt that the advantages to be gained from the constitution "consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation of the
Union will impose on local factions." 101 James Wilson of Philadelphia
wanted to "fill, as fast as possible; this extensive country, with men
who shall live happy, free, and secure" and wondered "how is it to be
accomplished, but by establishing peace and harmony among ourselves?"102 As the purpose of the Constitution was to ·check faction, so
the reach of the powers granted by the Constitution had to extend to
the causes of faction. As Hamilton stated, "[w]hatever practices may
have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States are proper
objects of federal superintendence and control." 103 On June 13, 1787,
the convention "[r]esolved that the national Legislature ought to be
97. IV ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 229.
98. Id.
99. I FARRAND, supra note 87, at 316.
100. II ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 305.
101. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, No. 85 (A. Hamilton), at 582.
102. II ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 462-63.
103. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, No. 80 (A. Hamilton), at 534.
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empowered ... to legislate in all cases ... in which the harmony of the
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation." 104 Patrick McHenry's understanding of the Constitutional
Convention was that its purpose had been the ''preservation of the
union. " 105
Wilson, explaining the powers of the new government, said:
Whatever object of government is confined, in its operation and effects,
within the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the government of that state; whatever object of government extends, in its operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular state,
should be considered as belonging to the government of the United
States." 106

This formulation confirms that GCOs are not simply a local issue.
They are laws whose effects extend beyond the bounds of a particular
state, that may disturb the harmony between the states. They involve
the exercise of power by municipal governments in a fashion unfriendly to the health of the union. The central theme in the formation
of our federal system is that there be union and that the union be
empowered to reach "practices [tending] to disturb the harmony'' of
the union. 107
The usual federalism argument might urge a deference to GCOs
out of respect for the sovereign creatures of the states. That matters of
local interest might occasionally affect interstate relations is just a necessary side effect of the shared power that makes our federal system
function. There are three problems with this argument. The first is
that it exaggerates the definition of what is "local." The second is that
it ignores much of the Constitution's history and that history's concern with national unity. Finally, such an argument is undermined by
the fact that GCOs involve municipal, rather than state, power. In
one of the few specific references to municipal, rather than state,
power, Madison asked "was the precious blood of thousands spilt ...
not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty and safety,
but that ... particular municipal establishments[] might enjoy a certain extent of power?"lOS
B. Structural Constitutional Aspects of National Unity

While it is almost redundant to speak about both federalism and
structure, it is worth briefly examining how successful the Framers
were in carrying out their intent to create national unity with the Constitution. An examination of the ways in which the Constitution actu104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

I FARRAND, supra note 87, at 225.
II FARRAND, supra note 87, at 211 (emphasis in original).
II ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 424.
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, No. 80 (A. Hamilton), at 534.
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, No. 45 (J. Madison), at 304.
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ally operates to preserve national unity will further elucidate the status
of national unity as an aspect of federalism.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the structural scheme which
ensures national unity is the supremacy clause. 109 That clause
grounds the government in the proposition that the interests of the
collectivity are supreme. This ensures that factional self-interest must
give way to considerations of collective welfare. National unity would
be nearly, if not completely, impossible where there could be no curb
on factional, self-interested conduct.
. The federal structure also contributes to national unity py reducing
the opportunities for interstate friction. The Constitution structures
relations between citizens and other states, and between states, so as to
eliminate potential conflicts. Some examples will help illustrate this
pattern. The privileges and immunities clause reduces. the opportunities for friction by ensuring even-handed treatment of federal citizens.110 The full faith and credit clause 111 and the extradition
clause112 mandate interstate cooperation on potentially contentious issues. The commerce power is vested solely in Congress, and states are
forbidden to tax the commerce of other states. 113 Populous states are
disabled from using congressional majorities to wield the commerce
power to their benefit both by uniform senate representation and by a
specific prohibition in section nine of article one. 114 ·
Finally, where these efforts fail to eliminate interstate contentiousness, the constitutional scheme ameliorates the effect of the dispute.
Article III provides an independent and disinterested judicial forum.
Section two of article III emphasizes this function of the federal judiciary by exhaustively committing to federal jurisdiction various interstate conflicts. Thus the intentions of the Framers largely coincide
with the resultant federal scheme: national unity is protected by federal authority to eliminate, reduce, or adjudicate instance$ of interstate
friction.
C. National Unity According to the Supreme Court
The evidence for national unity as a component of federalism does
not end with the Framers' understanding and execution of the Constitution. What the Framers codified, the courts have been called upon
time and again to interpret. On the occasions when it has considered
questions of national unity, the Supreme Court has found itself in
109. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2.
110. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
111. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
112. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 ("No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another").
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agreement with the Framers about the importance of national unity.
The commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause are the
textual foundations of the Constitution's national unity prescription.115 The Court's observations on the national unity strand of federalism are typically found in cases interpreting these clauses. This
section examines some of these cases and in them finds further support
for the national unity component of federalism.
Hicklin v. Orbeck 116 clearly articulates the national unity concerns
of federalism. Hicklin involved a challenge to the Alaska hire law,
which granted an unqualified hiring preference to Alaskans in oilresource-exploiting employment. In Hicklin, the Court based its holding on the privileges and immunities clause. Despite the usual practice
of not reaching an analysis under alternative grounds, 117 a unanimous
Court nonetheless went on to examine the law in light of several commerce clause decisions. It did so because of "the mutually reinforcing
relationship between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV,
§ 2, and the Commerce Clause - a relationship that stems from . . .
their shared vision of federalism." 118 That shared vision was one the
Court had earlier described as that of harmony between the states, of
"a single nation - one and the same people." 119
It was a vision of federalism that the Court had discussed at length
in Austin v. New Hampshire. 120 Austin involved a complicated tax system which favored New Hampshire residents. Tax classifications like
the one at issue in Austin normally benefit from judicial deference.
But that deference was inappropriate not only where the Court was
charged with "the protection of individual liberties," but also where
the regulation intruded upon
the maintenance of our constitutional federalism. The Privileges and
Immunities Clause, by making noncitizenship or nonresidence an improper basis for locating a special burden, implicates . . . the structural
balance essential to the concept of federalism. Since nonresidents are not
represented in the taxing State's legislative halls, judicial acquiescence in
taxation schellles that burden them particularly would remit them to
such redress as they could secure through their own State; but "to prevent [retaliation] was one of the chief ends sought to be accomplished by
the adoption of the Constitution." 121
115. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
116. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
117. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (The "Ashwander Rules") ("The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding itJ ").
118. 437 U.S. 531-32 (footnote omitted).
119. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596, ajfd., 263 U.S. 350 (1923) (commerce
clause) (natural gas producing state may not require preference for its consumers).
120. 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
121. 420 U.S. at 662 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Travis v. Yale & Towne
Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 82 (1920)).
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This formulation points out that one important advantage of the
national union is that the interests of all its members are considered in
its forums. State and local process seldom considers the interests of
outsiders. The outsiders have no say in the local agenda which nonetheless affects them. The inaccessibility of local process to outsiders
implicates fundamental structural concerns of federalism. Where
these federalism concerns are implicated, the Court has stated that the
judiciary should review the legislation with "an appropriately heightened ... standard of review." 122 In a privileges and immunities clause
context, that standard disables states from making distinctions which
"hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single
Union of those States."123
That heightened standard of review is reflected in the court's skeptical attitude toward the justifications offered for laws which make
those unity-hindering distinctions. This is illustrated by the Court's
opinion in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. 124 Seelig was a commerce
clause challenge to a New York law setting minimum prices for milk
imported into New York. This implicated the commerce clause and
the national unity concerns of federalism by discouraging competition
in the "economic unit [that] is the Nation." 125 It was argued that the
protection against sister state competition was justified because the
true goal of the law was the health of New York's residents. By guaranteeing dairy farmers' incomes, the state could ensure "a regular and
adequate supply of pure and wholesome milk." 126 But a hard look at
that reasoning left the Court unpersuaded:
To give entrance to that excuse would be to invite a speedy end of our
national solidarity. The Constitution was framed under the dominion of
a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the
theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together,
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division. 127
This vision of federalism can also be found in City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey. 128 New Jersey had justified the exclusion of out-of-state
waste from its landfills on the basis of environmental concerns. The
Court felt it was unnecessary to examine the justification "because its
resolution would not be relevant to the constitutional issue to be decided in this case." 129 Why New Jersey had done it was not as important as what New Jersey had done. "What is crucial is the attempt by
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

420 U.S. at 663.
Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Ganie Commn., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
294 U.S. 511 (1935).
H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949).
294 U.S. at 523.
294 U.S. at 523.
437 U.S. 617 (1978).
437 U.S. at 626.
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one State ~o isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting
a barrier against the movement of interstate trade." 130 Alluding to the
shared structural concerns of the two clauses, the Court cited both
privileges and immunities clause and commerce clause cases for the
proposition that it "ha[s] consistently found parochial legislation of
this kind to be constitutionally invalid." 131 So'it was that New Jersey
had to take New York's garbage. And in the GCO context, if New
Jersey must take New'York's garbage, then California must take the
Midwest's people. When a city shuts its doors to outsiders, it invites
their resentment. They invite, by their example, emulation and a
proliferation of places unavailable to the rest of the nation's people
that could in turn make for a fractured and unhappy nation. No view
of federalism that would rob the nation of its ability to deal with such
a threat can be sound. It is certainly not consistent with the Supreme
Court's view of our Constitution.

III.

GCOs AND SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

The view of the Supreme Court informs the GCO issue not only in
its observations about federalism, but also in its treatment of the constitutional protections that most frequently involve national unity issues. Those protections are the privileges and immunities clause, the
right of interstate travel, and the commerce clause. The three share a
common theme: that the United States is not merely a collection of
trading partners, but a cohesive union of people and states whose ultimate success will depend on their cooperation and their collective efforts. Given the extent to which GCOs implicate national unity
concerns, it is appropriate that this Note concludes with an examination of the protections that embody that unity. Such an examination is
certainly more appropriate to an issue raising those concerns than is
due process analysis. Although due process is the traditional vehicle
for GCO analysis, its standards become distorted when trying to deal
with the broader federal interests implicated by GCOs. This Part outlines in separate sections the substantive standards of the protections
better suited to those interests: the privileges and immunities clause,
the right of interstate travel, and the commerce clause. GCOs are
then tested by these standards. The results of all three analyses are
similar. All three tests ask whether any constitutionally unintrusive
alternative means are available. Each test also finds that most GCOs
are constitutionally infirm.
130. 437 U.S. at 628.
131. 437 U.S. at 627. The Court's statement was followed by citations to, inter a/ia, Toomer
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (privileges and immunities clause) (see infra text accompanying
notes 140-41 for a discussion of Toomer); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (commerce
clause) (see infra text accompanying notes 204-06 for a discussion of Edwards); Seelig, 294 U.S.
511 (1935) (commerce clause).
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The Privileges and Immunities Clause

This section applies the privileges and immunities clause to GCOs.
GCOs implicate the privileges and immunities clause by virtue of their
effect on citizens' ability to migrate and settle in GCO-enacting communities. The key word in the preceding sentence is effect. This section first establishes that GCOs that offend the privileges and
immunities clause not facially, but only in their effect, should nonetheless be subject to privileges and immunities clause scrutiny. This section then turns to an analysis of the privileges and immunities clause
standard and its application to GCOs.
1.

Of Privileges, Immunities, and Facial Neutrality

GCOs are facially neutral in their treatment of nonmunicipal instate and nonmunicipal out-of-state citizens. Even municipal citizens
wishing to relocate in a GCO-enacting community would feel the
same effects. 132 This Note argues that GCOs are noµetheless subject
to privileges and immunities clause scrutiny.
First, to the extent that the facial neutrality argument depends on
the idea that nonmunicipal in-state residents are similarly disadvantaged, that argument has been specifically rejected by the ·Court.
When considering a municipal hire law in United Building and Con~
struction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 133 the Court "conclude[d] that [the] ordinance is not immune from constitutional review
at the behest of out-of-state residents merely because some in-state residents are similarly disadvantaged."134
Another reason the privileges and immunities clause should reach
GCOs comes from the Framers' understanding of the Constitution.
As discussed supra in section II.A, the Framers believed that they
were establishing a charter with power sufficient to reach "[w]hatever
practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the
states." 135 That intent is frustrated when a constitutional provision is
unable to reach threats to that unity. The Framers' understanding
would thus be confounded by an argument that concedes the constitutionality of facially neutral legislation.
Reliance on the language and intent of the privileges and immunities clause also argues for subjecting facially neutral GCOs to privileges and immunities clause scrutiny. The language of the privileges
and immunities clause is straightforward. "The Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
132. Although these effects would be felt to a far lesser degree by municipal residents who
were property owners and thus had enjoyed a GCO-engendered rise in property values.
133. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
134. 465 U.S. at 217-18.
135. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, No. 80 (A. Hamilton), at 534.
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several States." 136 It does not include only "those Privileges and Immunities offended by facially discriminatory enactments." Nor does it
exclude "those Privileges and Immunities abridged by the effect of
facially neutral provisions." It says that "all" citizens "shall" be entitled to "all" privileges and immunities. 137 The logistics of applying
the clause to a new area of the law should not result in its being
rewritten.
Additionally, the Court has been quite explicit about the import of
the clause. It has more than once said that "[t]he primary purpose of
this clause ... was to help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States." 138 Since the clause intends to bind together t:p.e national union it should invalidate laws that disrupt that
unity. Their disruptive effect does not depend on whether or not the
regulation is facially neutral; it depends on the regulation's effect.
GCOs operate to fence out people, to hinder patterns of national migration, to disrupt commerce and to give vent to, and to invite reciprocal, feelings of distrust and hostility between national neighbors. That
these effects are not listed on the face of the statute should not shield it
from the privileges and immunities clause. As one commentator put
it, "discrimination does not wear its badge on its sleeve." 13 9
In adqition, when conducting the privileges and immunities clause
inquiry, the Court often examines the effect of the challenged regulations.140 In Toomer v. Witsell, an examination of the fishing license
statute convinced the· Court "that its practical effect is virtually exclusionary. "141 Examining New Hampshire's discriminatory tax scheme
in Austin v. New Hampshire, 142 the Court again looked to effect: "The
effect of these imposition and exemption features is that no resident of
New Hampshire is taxed on his out-of-state income.... In effect, then,
the State taxes only the incomes of nonresidents working in New
136. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
137. See Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and The Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV. 128 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 386 (1979) ("[The privileges and immunities
clause] speaks in absolute, uncompromising terms - noncitizens 'shall be entitled' to 'all' privileges and immunities."); Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Cm. L. REV.
487, 516 (1981) ("The unqualified language of the privileges and immunities clause suggests that
the architects ... deliberately included ... a comprehensive ban on ..• discrimination against the
citizens of other states." (footnote omitted)).
138. United Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 216 (1984)
(quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948)) (municipal resident hiring-preference law).
See supra notes 133-34 for a discussion of Camden.
139. Freund, Umpiring The Federal System, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 561, 567 (1954).
140. This derives in large part from a tactic of privileges and immunities clause defendants.
Often, their position is that, despite the statute's facial discrimination, it is in effect neutral and
that it treats residents and nonresidents similarlJ. It would be ironic for defendants in privileges
and immunities clause cases to progress from arguing that the effect of the challenged laws is not
discriminatory to arguing that only the effect is discriminatory.
141. 334 U.S. 385, 396-97 (1948).
142. 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
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Hampshire ...." 143 Some years earlier, the Court had upheld property taxes on land owned by out-of-state citizens. In reaching that
decision, it looked to ''the practical effect and operation" of the tax
scheme. 144 The two-part privileges and immunities clause inquiry,
which asks whether a close relationship exists between the discrimination and a significant governmental interest, is formula for determining the act's effect. Asking whether a particular method
(discrimination) promotes (is closely related to) a· particular goal is
precisely to ask what the effect of that methoa is. Thus the privileges
and immunities clause test is a measure of effect. Because the Court
explicitly and practically relies on the effect of a challenged provision
in evaluating it, provisions such as GCOs, which have discriminatory
effect, should be subject to unreduced privileges and immunities clause
scrutiny. 145
Finally, it would be shortsighted to overlook the history of the effect of judicial deference to local land use regulation. That deference
has led to racial exclusion, 146 economic exclusion, 147 and even regulation of the types of families that can live in communities. 148 The history of local discretion in this area does not support the assumption
that municipalities would employ the license to effect discrimination
not facially apparent with a consistent regard for fairness. 149
The language and intent of the privileges and immunities clause,
the case law it has generated, and the nature of GCOs all counsel undiminished GCO review even though they are facially neutral. The
privileges and immunities clause therefore can and should reach
GCOs.

a

2.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause Standard

Since the privileges and immunities clause reaches GCOs, it is now
time to examine the privileges and immunities clause. The privileges
143. 420 U.S. at 659.
144. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 56 (1920).
145. See also Justice Kennedy's opinion in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman: "Nothing in our precedents, moreover, supports the contention that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause does not reach a State's discrimination against nonresidents when such discrimination
does not result in their total exclusion from the State." 487 U.S. 59, 66 (1988). This language is
also important with respect to the objection that GCOs deter migration only at the fringes, and
do not result in the "total exclusion" of nonresidents.
146. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704
(1930).
.
147. See," e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
148. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
149. Indeed, there has even been an attempt to regulate the type of cars residents can park in
their driveways. The city of Flossmoor, Illinois has attempted to prohibit the parking of pickup
trucks in residents' driveways. Johnson, For Pickup, No Parking in Its Own Driveway, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 13, 1989, at Al4, col. 6.
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and immunities clause of the federal constitution is succinct: "The
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." 150 Like the commerce, extradition, and full faith and credit clauses, it is derived from article IV of
the Articles of Confederation. 151 It shares with those clauses a harmonizing effect on the national union.
The privileges and immunities clause analysis is a two-step inquiry.
This two-step test, recently articulated by the Court in Supreme Court
of Virginia v. Friedman, 152 is (1) whether the regulation affects an interest fundamental enough to trigger the clause's scrutiny, and (2)
whether there are less intrusive means of furthering that regulation's
objectives. The test blends together two historically discrete strands of
privileges and immunities clause inquiry, and the history of their development informs the test's application. The first step, described by
the Court in Friedman as whether the interest affected by the challenged regulation is "sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation,"153 originated in the early nineteenth century privileges and
immunities clause cases and their concern with "those privilege and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental." 154 Sufficiently
fundamental privileges trigger the second step of the test, where the
Court requires that the regulation be "closely related to the advancement of a substantial state interest." 155 This second step of the inquiry
apparently began with the Supreme Court's 1920 admonishment that
"if there be no reasonable ground for the diversity of treatment, it
abridges the privileges and immunities [clause]." 156
The second prong of the privileges and immunities clause test has
been reified since 1920. In Toomer v. Witsel/ 157 the Court explained
that the privileges and immunities clause "does not preclude disparity
150. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
151. The text of the fourth article of the Articles of Confederation read:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people
of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers,
vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of free citizens in the several States, and the people of each State shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of
trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabit·
ants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent
the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State of which the owner is an
inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction shall be laid by any State,
on the property of the United States, or either of them.
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, app. at 591.
152. 487 U.S. 59 (1988).
153. 487 U.S. at 64 (quoting United Bldg. & Trade Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 211 (1984) (quoting Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Commn. v. Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371,
388 (1978))).
154. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
155. 487 U.S. at 65.
156. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 79 (1920).
157. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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of treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid
independent reasons for it. Thus the inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether the degree of
discrimination bears a close relation to them." 158 The discrimination
was constitutional if "there is something to indicate that non-citizens
constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is
aimed."159 Hicklin v. Orheck 160 concerned a challenge to the Alaska
Hire law. In that case the Court refined the Toomer test, requiring
that the discrimination against out-of-staters "bear a substantial relationship to the particular 'evil' they are said to present." 161 The means
by which that· discrimination was achieved "must be more closely tailored" to the ends sought. 162
This second part of the test has also been cast in terms of a twostep inquiry. This formulation was summed up by the Court in
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper. 163 The question was
whether "(i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears
a substantial relationship to the State's objective." 164 Though it may
seem that the structure of the test has reached the limits of clarity,
both Friedman and Piper conduct this two-step inquiry by asking a
single question. That question is whether "there exist alternative
means of furthering the State's purpose without implicating constitutional concerns."165
The first step of the inquiry will be satisfied if GCOs affect fundamental interests protected by the privileges and immunities clause.
GCOs affect the ability of federal citizens freely to migrate, to settle
and to acquire property. Thus, the question presented by the first step
of the privileges and immunities clause analysis is whether these activities are sufficiently basic to the national enterprise to trigger privileges
and immunities clause protection.
This part of the privileges and immunities clause inquiry is informed by examining the cases which develop this part of the test.
The first case to consider the privileges and immunities clause was
Maryland's Campbell v. Morris. 166 When defining the words immunities and privileges, the court stated "it means that the citizens of all
158. 334 U.S. at 396.
159. J34 U.S. at 398.
160. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
161. 437 U.S. at 527.
162. 437 U.S. at 528.
163. 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (requiring New Hampshire to admit nonresidents to its bar).
164. 470 U.S. at 284.
165. Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 67 (1988) (citing Piper, 470 U.S. at
284).
166. 3 Md. 288 (1797) (statute requiring different attachment procedures for in-state and
out-of-state citizens does not violate the privileges and immunities clause).
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the States shall have the peculiar advantage of acquiring and holding
real as well as personal property." 167 One of the first federal cases
construing the privileges and immunities clause was Corjield v.
Coryell 168 The federal circuit court was concerned with a law that
denied outstate citizens the privilege of fishing in New Jersey's oyster
beds. 169 To answer the question, "what are the privileges and immunities" was a task "more tedious than difficult." 170 The court had "no
hesitation" in answering that
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, . . . the right of a citizen of one state to pass
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture
or professional pursuits or otherwise; . . . to take, hold and dispose of
property, either real or personal •.. may be mentioned as some of the
particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are ... deemed to
be fundamental .... 171

The Supreme Court considered the privileges and immunities
clause in Paul v. Virginia. 172 They viewed the clause in much the same
way as the Coryell court. The intent of the clause was "to place the
citizens of each State upon the same footing as citizens of other States
... ; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by
the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property .... "113
Two years later the Court encountered the privileges and immunities clause again in Ward v. Maryland. 114 When asked "to define the
words privileges and immunities," which were "words of very comprehensive meaning," the Court felt it was
sufficient to say that the clause plainly and unmistakably secures and
protects the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any other State of
the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or
business without molestation; to acquire personal property; to take and
167. 3 Md. at 293.
168. 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
169. The court sustained the law, a result that is extremely unlikely, if not foreclosed, today.
See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (holding that out·of·state shrimp fishing licensure
fees one hundred times that of in-state fees were prohibited by the privileges and immunities
clause).
170. 6 F. Cas. at 551.
171. 6 F. Cas. at 551-52 (emphasis added).
172. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). Paul held that a law requiring special licensing and bond·
ing procedures for foreign insurance corporations doing business in Virginia did not offend the
privileges and immunities clause because corporations were not citizens within the meaning of
the privileges and immunities clause. Paul also held that insurance was not commerce within the
meaning of the commerce clause. The commerce clause holding of Paul was reversed in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944). This holding, in tum, generated congressional response in the form of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1954), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982) (returning insurance regulation to the states).
173. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180.
174. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870) (invalidating a licensing tax on out-of-state traders 2 to 25
times higher than that required of in-state traders).
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hold real estate. 115

3. Applying the Standard
The history of the first step of the privileges and immunities clause
inquiry shows that the clause regards the ability to move to, and to
buy property in, other states as fundamental. Without housing, the
privilege of interstate migration is meaningless, and the ability to acquire real property disappears since GCOs artificially constrict housing supply, 176 they thus affect "sufficiently basic" interests to trigger
the second step of the privileges and immunities clause test.
Applying that test will determine whether GCOs are closely related to the advancement of a substantial governmental interest by
asking whether their purposes can be achieved by means which do not
implicate constitutional concerns. The usual purposes of GCOs are to
give communities time to develop growth plans and to cope with traffic and pollution. What alternative means of coping with growthrelated problems are available? At the outset, it can be argued that the
planning process is facilitated by growth already underway. An overview of emerging settlement, development, and traffic patterns may
inform the best use of the community's resources. 177 It can suggest
what boulevards to widen and which rivers shoUld host parks and
which rivers should host industry. Coordinating local growth with
that of surrounding communities is a sound approach, and this too is
more efficiently accomplished when growth is underway. 178 Modeling
local growth plans after those of similarly sized and situated communities which have successfully coped with growth can hasten the process.179 Traffic problems can also be helped by retiming traffic lights,
amending municipal traffic codes, building highways, and expanding
mass transit. 180 These steps, in hand with regulation of automobile
175. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 430 (emphasis added).
176. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. This argument does not suggest the privileges
and immunities clause guarantees a house to people in any particular community, but it does
suggest that in the competition for housing in growing communities, municipalities are not able
to advantage their current residents at the expense of nonmunicipal federal citizens. A municipal
law which said "nobody from any other state can move here" would surely be suspect under the
privileges and immunities clause. As a practical, and a local political, matter this is exactly what
GCOs say. See News & Views, supra note 7, at 6, col. 5 {"I don't think there's any reason why
everybody in the country has to come to San Diego ..•.").
177. F. CHAPIN & E. KAISER, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 174 {3d ed. 1979) ("[C]urrent
population estimates and studies of the present composition and distribution of population are
essential as a point of beginning in planning analyses and in the continuing task of revising ...
the resulting plans.").
178. Id. at 368; see also WELSH OFFICE, GR. BRIT. MINISTRY OF Hous. AND LoCAL GOVT.,
DEVELOPMENT PLANS: A MANUAL ON FORM AND CONTENT 41 {1970).
179. See, e.g., J. LANSING, R. MARANS & R. ZEHNER, PLANNED RESIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENTS (1970) (study of 10 developed communities to determine, inter a/ia, efficient transportation system design).
180. See generally J. DICKEY, METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING (1970); URBAN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING GUIDE (G. Steuart ed. 1977).
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and industrial emissions, can alleviate air pollution problems. As a
technical, as opposed to a substantive matter, the planning process can
be expedited by extra city planning meetings, accelerated legislative
action, and support staff overtime. Thus a broad range of constitutionally sound alternative measures is available to enliven the planning
process and to cope with traffic and growth problems.
It is important to recognize what this formulation does not mean:
it does not mean that every conceivable zoning law is unconstitutional.
It does not mean that a comprehensive general plan with use districts
and density regulations is invalid because it may have incidental effects
on federal citizens' privileges and immunities interests. 181 It does not
mean that municipalities are paralyzed in their efforts to deal with
unexpected growth. It simply means that they may not take aim,
either deliberately or by default, at their national neighbors because a .
GCO is a more convenient and less demanding response to growth.
Moreover, the formulation not only accommodates reasoned responses to growth, it also allows for the situations where a municipality might have no alternative means to achieve its growth control
purpose. But this is a determination that should be based on a hard
look at the facts and a due regard for the privileges and immunities
clause. For example, a city with severe budget constraints and a sewer
system bordering on emergency might have no alternative means. A
GCO may be the only way such a community could forestall a health
emergency. In this and other drastic cases, GCOs as a temporary
measure, to give a city time to upgrade its infrastructure and restore
fiscal soundness, would likely be constitutionally permissible. But
where alternative means of achieving the city's goals are available,
GCOs should fail the privileges and immunities clause test. They implicate fundamental privileges and immunities clause concerns and
lack a sufficiently close relationship to the public interest.
B.

The Right of Interstate Travel

It has been suggested that the privileges and immunities clause is
the source of the right of interstate travel. The right of interstate
travel shares with the privileges and immunities clause the intention of
creating a stronger national union. 182 By guaranteeing the right to
unburdened interstate travel, the right of interstate travel works to
promote interstate harmony and the health of the nation's economy.183 The right of interstate travel is a reflection of the fact "that
181. On comprehensive plans, see generally 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 18, § 23.01-15. On
use restrictions, see 2 id. § 9.24-53. On density regulation, see 3 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 24,
§ 34.03.
182. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
183. Varat, supra note 137, at 511; see also Comment, Another Constitutional Standard,
supra note 19 at 630.

April 1990)

Growth Control and the Constitution

1275

the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of
personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel
throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes,
rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement." 184 The fundamental nature of that freedom means that the
right of interstate travel is a fundamental right. Fundamental rights
are protected by strict scrutiny review under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The infringment of fundamental rights
must be justified by a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster.
As the term "strict" implies, it is a level of scrutiny few regulations
can survive.1 85 The right of interstate travel inquiry has been conducted in terms of a "penalty analysis."1 86 Shapiro v. Thompson 187
was the first time the Court invoked strict scrutiny for "any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right." 188 In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County the Court disapproved indigent
health care qualifications which "penalize[d people] for exercising
their right to migrate to and settle in that State." 189 In Dunn v. Blumstein the Court invalidated voting requirements which "impermissibly
condition and penalize the right to [interstate] travel." 19°
GCOs do affect the "free[dom] to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land .... " 191 GCOs raise the price and limit or eliminate the supply of housing. By doing so, they make interstate travel
and resettlement more difficult, more costly, less feasible, and penalize
people "for exercising their right to migrate to and settle in that
State." 192 Since they penalize that right, GCOs must be measured
against the yardstick of strict scrutiny.
The strict scrutiny analysis that is dictated by the right of interstate travel has been described in terms similar to, but more stringent
than, those of the second step of the privileges and immunities clause
inquiry. Right of interstate travel analysis requires that "if there are
other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of
greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic
184. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (invalidating welfare residency requirements which interfered with exercise of the right of interstate travel).
185. See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. l, 8 (1972) (discussing "the aggressive
'new' equal protection with scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
186. L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 1455-57.
187. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
188. 394 U.S. at 634.
189. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 261-62 (1974).
190. 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972).
191. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
192. Maricopa, 415 U.S. 250, 261-62 (1974).
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means.' " 193 Here, as with the privileges and immunities clause, interim planning informed by occurring growth, infrastructural improvements, local and state environmental regulation, and accelerated
planning timetables are examples of constitutionally inoffensive methods of achieving the same goals. 194 Here too, the right of interstate
travel will accommodate the extreme case when there is no other way
to achieve those goals. Since those goals can usually be attained by
less burdensome means, GCOs will ordinarily fail the strict scrutiny
right of interstate travel analysis.
It should be noted that as a practical matter, strict scrutiny-interstate travel analysis of GCOs is unlikely to occur. The post-Warren
Court has been unwilling generally to extend strict scrutiny analysis 195
and several recent right of interstate travel cases have been decided
under the more limited rational basis scrutiny. 196 The right of interstate travel is nonetheless important here. The structural concerns of
national unity that this right shares with the privileges and immunities
clause and the commerce clause highlight the nature of the problems
which GCOs pose. Moreover, it shows, as did the privileges and immunities clause, that when reviewed by standards solicitous of national unity interests, most GCOs are constitutionally infirm. Not
suprisingly, commerce clause analysis of GCOs offers the same conclusion, and the final section of this Part turns to that clause.
C.

GCOs and the Commerce Clause

The commerce clause is similar to the privileges and immunities
clause. Like that clause, it has been suggested as a constitutional basis
for the right of interstate travel. 197 It shares with the privileges and
immunities clause and the right of interstate travel the intent of creating a more cohesive national union:198 The presence of the commerce
clause has long been held to prohibit state regulation of interstate commerce, even where Congress has not chosen to regulate in that area. 199
This is called the "dormant commerce clause.'' For the dormant commerce clause to reach GCOs, they must affect interstate commerce.
They do. GCOs affect the trade in building materials which would
193. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
194. See supra section III.A.3.
195. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (refusing to
accord fundamental right status, and therefore strict scrutiny, to education); see also Gunther,
supra note 185, at 12-15.
196. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S.
55 (1982); see also Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (plurality believes that
veteran preference on civil service exam violates right of interstate travel and should receive strict
scrutiny; two other Justices assert only rational basis scrutiny is necessary).
197. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1969).
198. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
199. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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otherwise be sold and used. This trade alone is a sufficient connection
with interstate commerce to bring GCOs under the clause's aegis. 200
But given the intent of the clause and its similarity to the privileges
and immunities clause, it is more appropriate to focus on the people
who no longer cross state lines because of GCOs. Therefore, this section first establishes the proposition that people constitute commerce
and enable the clause to reach GCOs.
That people constitute commerce is a conclusion the Court first
reached in 1894. In Covington and Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky,
the people crossing the Covington and Cincinnati Bridge between
Ohio and Kentucky were "engaged in commerce [as surely] as if they
were shipping cargoes of merchandise from New York to Liverpool."201 In Hoke v. United States, 202 Effie Hoke was prosecuted
under the White Slave Traffic Act for transporting Annette B~den
across state lines for purposes of prostitution. Whether people were
commerce would decide whether Congress had the authority-to enact
the law. They were, the Court concluded, because "[c]ommerce
among the States . . . includes the transportation of persons. " 203 Finally, Edwards v. California 204 concerned a law which made it a crime
to bring indigent people into California. According to the Court, the
state wished to find "respite from the pressure of events by ... shutting its gates to the outside world." 205 Preventing those people from
entering the state was a "burden upon interstate commerce [both] intended and immediate."206
That people constitute commerce is a settled issue. By virtue of
their effect on the migration of people, as well as the trade in building
materials, GCOs come within the reach of the commerce clause. This
connection would certainly be sufficient to enable Congress to exercise
its authority under the clause. The remaining question is whether the
connection is also sufficient to bring GCOs under the purview of the
dormant commerce clause.
Two facts show that it is. First, the effect on interstate migration
in Edwards was sufficient for the dormant commerce clause to reach
the law challenged in that case. Second, the Court has explicitly
stated that the reach of the clause is identical in both its regulatory
and dormant aspects. This occurred in City of Philadelphia v. New
200. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (shipping building materials
across state lines constitutes a connection with commerce sufficient to enable congressional
regulation).
201. 154 U.S. 204, 218-19 (1894).'
202. 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
203. 227 U.S. at 320. When the issue resurfaced in Carninetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
491 (1917), it warranted only a reference to Hoke.
204. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
205. 314 U.S. at 173.
206. 314 U.S. at 174.
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Jersey, 207 a case which was discussed earlier in connection with the
Supreme Court's view of federalism. 208 The New Jersey Supreme
Court had upheld New Jersey's landfill law,2°9 and the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed on the grounds that the restriction constituted a violation of the dormant commerce clause. The New Jersey court had considered the commerce clause, but concluded it could not apply to
landfill. This was based on "the view that there may be two definitions
of 'commerce' for constitutional purposes."210 New Jersey thought
the dormant clause had a "much more confined ... reach." 211 The
Supreme Court disagreed. "We think the state court misread our
cases, and thus erred in assuming that they require a two-tiered definition of commerce."212 ·There is no distinction between dormant and
regulatory definitions of commerce. Commerce is commerce. The
dormant commerce clause will reach GCOs because people constitute
commerce.
Since the clause reaches GCOs, the next question is whether it also
prohibits them. Review under the dormant commerce clause has long
been concerned with the effect of a regulation on interstate commerce. 213 This, and the purpose the clause shares with the privileges
and immunities clause, preempts facial neutrality defenses. The prevailing test is articulated in Hughes v. Oklahoma. 214 Hughes held that
a law forbidding out-of-state transportation of minnows violated the
commerce clause. The test which supplied the "general rule" used by
the court was "(1) whether the challenged statute ... discriminates
against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2)
whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and if so, (3)
whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as well
without discriminating against interstate commerce." 215
The first inquiry under this test is whether GCOs discriminate
against interstate commerce "in practical effect," if not on their face.
The effect on interstate migration that establishes the basis for commerce clause review also satisfies the first step of this test. The next
step is also satisfied. The local purposes used to justify GCOs - alle207. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
208. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
209. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Commn. v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N.J.
451, 348 A.2d 505 (1975).
210. 437 U.S. at 621.
211. 437 U.S. at 621 (quoting Hackensack, 68 N.J. at 469, 348 A.2d at 514).
212. 437 U.S. at 622.
213. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Pike v. Bruce Church, 397
U.S. 137 (1970); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commn., 432 U.S. 333 (1977); see
also Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Com·
merce Clause, 84 MICH L. REv. 1091, 1105-07 (1986); Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1708 (1984).
214. 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (overruling Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)).
215. 441 U.S. at 336.
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viation of traffic and pollution problems and planning grace periods are unquestionably legitimate. The purposes are equally so in the critical case where the alternatives are a public health emergency or municipal bankruptcy. Most GCOs, however, will run afoul of the third
element of the test. In all but the extraordinary case, those purposes
can be satisfied by other measures. 216 Since those purposes can usually
be achieved without "discriminating against interstate commerce,"
most GCOs will be prohibited by the dormant commerce clause.
Under all three bases of review proposed by this section, then,
GCOs are found wanting. The common thread running through these
three areas is that of nationai unity. It is not so much that GCOs are
repugnant to a collection of constitutional protections as it is that they
intrude on the underlying theme of national unity. With that interest
in mind, this Part concludes with a return to the question of due process review of GCOs.
D. Due Process Revisited

This examination of more appropriate bases of GCO review should
further illustrate the point made in Part I: Due process is the wrong
standard for reviewing GCOs. GCOs implicate national interests and
should be examined under the bases which recognize those interests.
The due process clause was not designed to consider the national interests in unity, travel, and resettlement. The privileges and immunities
clause, the right of interstate travel, and the commerce clause were.
They approach the problem from a national perspective. Their standards do not have to be changed, as due process standards need to be,
to accommodate the national unity interests that are compromised by
GCOs. Furthermore, the Euclidian deference appropriate to local regulators under the due process clause is inappropriate when GCOs are
considered. The privileges and immunities clause, the right of interstate travel, and the commerce clause instead accord deference to the
needs of national unity. The due process clause is better left to the
areas it was meant to regulate: takings and compensation.
CONCLUSION

GCOs are a complicated issue. The quality of life in developing
communities is an issue of no small moment to the people who do and
will live there. Unplanned and poorly planned growth can devastate
that quality. Moreover, it would seem that GCOs are entitled to presumptive respect because they arise from the police power so necessary
to the orderly function of society. If the only interests implicated by
GCOs were the pecuniary losses of local developers, that deference
216. See supra section 111.A.3.
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would be appropriate. But one of the reasons that GCOs are a complicated issue is that they affect a myriad of other interests.
They affect the interests of federal citizens in migrating freely
about the union. They affect the interests of the union in maintaining
harmony and cooperation among its members. That interest in harmony was regarded as .fundamental by the Framers and woven into
the text of the Constitution they wrote. The Court in turn has repeatedly affirmed the national unity prescription of the Constitution in
cases involving the protections which embody that unity. The breadth
of the GCO issue is again made apparent by the many constitutional
protections they offend as they intrude on national unity. Those protections are the privileges and immunities clause, the right of interstate
travel and the commerce clause.
Because these protections are solicitous of the needs of national
unity and because the due process clause is ill-equipped to consider
those needs, it is against these protections which GCOs must be
gauged. While the public welfare component of the due process standards could be expanded to consider those interests, that approach
cheats both the due process standards and the issues they are expanded to include. The privileges and immunities clause, the right. of
interstate travel, and the commerce clause teach a single lesson:
GCOs are constitutionally infirm except where no other solution is
possible. Yes, proper regard for the interests of national unity and
federal citizens may cause some hardships for citizens of growing communities. But since the days of the Constitutional Convention it has
been clear that these federal and national interests are more compelling. It is in their favor that the balances must tip when GCOs are
weighed.
- Keith R. Denny

